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Statutory Meanings 
DERIVING INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES FROM A 
THEORY OF COMMUNICATION AND LAWMAKING 
Mathew D. McCubbins† 
Daniel B. Rodriguez‡ 
Statutes are best understood as a form of communication. 
Communicating messages requires a sender and receiver. The 
sender encodes her message in the form of communication, and 
the receiver’s task is to decode this message so that she can 
understand what it means. In all forms of communication that 
include commands, the challenge is to make sure that the 
commands can be effectively decoded and thus implemented as 
appropriate.1 In short, we view statutory interpretation’s 
essential purpose as producing “a constitutionally legitimate 
decoding of [ambiguous] statutory commands.”2 Although 
legislation is admittedly a very stylized rendering of a 
multifaceted, complex structure of law, politics, and institutional 
performance, we see value in reducing the far-flung objective of 
interpreting legislation to a core purpose. With this core purpose 
in mind, we can proceed to the critical task of evaluating 
competing approaches to discerning statutory meaning.  
The focus of this essay is to advance the conversation. 
Part I recapitulates the basic elements of communication 
theory and positive political theory, and their potent 
applications to statutory interpretation. Part II explains how a 
nuanced understanding of the lawmaking structure in 
  
 † Provost Professor of Business, Law, and Political Economy, University of 
Southern California, Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law, and 
Department of Political Science. 
 ‡ Minerva House Drysdale Regents Chair in Law, Professor of Government 
(by courtesy), University of Texas. 
 1 See Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from 
Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957 (2007) 
[hereinafter Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean]; Cheryl Boudreau et al., Statutory 
Interpretation and the Intentional(ist) Stance, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2131 (2005) 
[hereinafter Boudreau et al., The Intentional(ist) Stance].  
 2 Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 959. 
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Congress has valuable implications for understanding 
statutory meaning. Finally, in Part III, we sketch some 
thoughts about how the bridge between communication theory 
and positive political theory can illuminate debates about the 
use and misuse of extrinsic aids in interpretation, especially 
the so-called canons of statutory interpretation. 
While the normative question at the heart of the 
enduring statutory-interpretation debate is whether and to 
what extent legislative communications should be 
authoritative,3 we give that question a rest in this essay. 
Rather, we are interested here in developing a model of 
statutory meaning and looking hard at whether this model can 
yield useful techniques for decoding statutes. Nor does this 
essay focus on the central matter of statutory authority and the 
dynamic relationship between legislatures and courts. 
Although this issue has been prominent in other work we have 
done separately and collaboratively,4 we assume here that 
statutes are constitutionally pedigreed commands and that the 
objective of interpreting a statute is to recover its meaning 
using a theory of both communication and lawmaking. 
I.  THE SCIENCE OF COMMUNICATION 
While much of communication theory is motivated by 
algorithms derived for compressing and then expanding messages 
from one computer to another, the theory is quite general and has 
been applied to viruses, bacteria, and other infectious agents, as 
well as to speech and writing.5 The act of writing a statute, when 
reduced to its essentials, begins with an idea about what should 
be policy. Second, this idea about policy information is compressed 
into a written document. While great pains may be taken to 
accurately compress ideas into language, this process is not 
always perfect. Interpretive difficulties frequently arise; indeed, 
they are perhaps inevitable given cognitive deficiencies, as well as 
  
 3 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH 
GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (3d ed. 2006). 
 4 See sources cited supra note 1; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. 
Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
1207 (2007); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of 
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its 
Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003). 
 5 See generally DAVID J.C. MACKAY, INFORMATION THEORY, INFERENCE, AND 
LEARNING ALGORITHMS 3-5 (2003); J. R. PIERCE, SYMBOLS, SIGNALS AND NOISE: THE 
NATURE AND PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION 8-9 (James R. Newman ed., 1961). 
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the limits of language and the difficulty of constructing 
institutions capable of successful compression. 
Moreover, compression is done with an eye toward the 
transmission, reception, and, ultimately, the expansion of the 
document into meaning by the receiver. This is perhaps the key 
takeaway point of communication theory: those who do the 
compressing are necessarily aware of the need for the message 
to be later expanded. Of course, it is well known that error and 
biases can be introduced into the transmission and expansion, 
causing the meaning to be distorted. These problems may or 
may not be intentional; in any event, they are ubiquitous 
problems and hence increase difficulties for communicators in 
compressing the communication and for recipients in 
expanding it. Third, the ideas about policy are transmitted over 
a channel or channels. Fourth, the messages are received, and 
the ideas that were compressed into written language are 
expanded into meaning. This is the key: in perfectly operating 
communication, not only is the transmission lossless (i.e., there 
is no error) but the expansion is the inverse (or mirror image) 
of the compression. The authors of messages often send other 
messages in conjunction with the original (such as parity bits 
in electronic communication) in order to reduce transmission 
and expansion errors. 
At an abstract level, our argument is based upon 
overlapping common-sense views about the nature of 
communication. By definition, communication requires a 
sharing in common. Not only is this part of the etymology of the 
term (the word “communication” derives from the Latin root 
comm-nis6) but it also makes good sense that one person’s efforts 
to communicate with another suppose that they have shared 
purposes with respect to that communication.7 Two individuals 
who do not speak one another’s language will find it rather 
difficult, without further aids, to make sense of what the other 
says. Although we offer no particularly sophisticated view about 
how “sharing in common” is accomplished,8 we make the simple 
point that an assessment of a communication’s meaning 
requires, at the very least, a sharing in common. 
  
 6 WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 367 (2d ed. 1983). 
 7 See Boudreau et al., The Intentional(ist) Stance, supra note 1, at 2140-42. 
 8 The sharing-in-common phenomenon has been examined in several fields 
of study. Disciplines ranging from communication theory to linguistics to anthropology 
continue to advance our understanding of these vital questions. 
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A few scientific propositions about human 
communication can aid those who seek to determine what a 
statute’s authors meant when they chose to include (or to not 
include) particular words in a piece of legislation. To this end, 
we build from well-known communication theories. The key 
insight of these theories is that successful inference about 
meaning requires that the manner in which a communication 
is decoded (i.e., the expansion of the signal into information) 
relate to aspects of its manufacture (i.e., the compression of 
information into a signal) in particular ways.9 What this insight 
suggests for scholars of statutory interpretation (and for judges 
interpreting statutes) is that discerning the meaning of any 
piece of legislation requires an understanding of how it was 
manufactured throughout the legislative process.10  
Communication involves both a sender and a receiver, 
both of whom must usually make costly efforts to ensure that a 
message is faithfully received. Basic tenets of information 
theory suggest that communication can be viewed as a series of 
processes (represented in Figure 1 below) where an idea borne 
in the sender’s mind (1) is transcribed in a message that, (2) 
with some distortion, is transmitted to the receiver, with error, 
and (3) received and decoded by the receiver. 
 
Figure 1. The Process of Communication 
 
           Message                  Signal                 Signal             Message 
    
Source  
 
Compression  Channel 
with Noise 
 Expansion  Receiver 
 
 
The process of communication and the requirements for 
accurate interpretation are the same for statutes as they are 
for all other forms of communication. Indeed, the literature on 
communication theory and cognitive science suggests that the 
communication process is ubiquitous; that is, whether we are 
communicating written words, electrical signals, spoken 
  
 9 Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 959.  
 10 PIERCE, supra note 5, at 118; Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra 
note 1, at 959.  
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language, gestures, or viruses, all communication involves the 
processes of compression and expansion.11 In general, 
compression takes a large domain of information and 
transforms it flexibly so that the compression can be carried 
forward for future expansion. Ideas and concepts are 
compressed into language and transmitted by actions such as 
speaking, writing, and gesturing; this is analogous to the 
process by which our voices are compressed into electrical 
signals, transmitted, and then expanded back into sound waves 
when we talk on the phone.  
In the communication process, the signal begins as a 
message that the sender transmits through a channel. In the 
channel, the message is compressed into a signal, which then 
passes through a transmitter. The transmitter then sends the 
signal along one or more channels to the receiver, who expands 
the signal back into a message. At the end of the process, the 
receiver discerns from the message the information that was 
successfully transmitted. 
Crucially, successful communication depends both on 
the sender’s ability to properly compress the message being 
sent and on the receiver’s ability to correctly perceive the 
message and to apply the correct expansion algorithm to 
reverse the compression process.12 In an ideal world, the 
expansion algorithm would precisely match the compression 
algorithm used to send the original message. As communication 
in the real world departs from this ideal, the receiver’s ability 
to faithfully decode the original message deteriorates. 
To this point, our depiction of the compression-
expansion process has neglected the identity of the sender and 
the recipient. In the context of statutory lawmaking, the sender 
is the legislature, and the recipient is anyone who needs to 
understand the statute’s meaning. To sharpen this matter, we 
focus on judicial statutory interpretation. While courts are 
certainly not the only—and perhaps not even the primary—
intended recipients of the communication, they do, at the very 
least, play a key role in interpreting statutory meaning and, to 
that end, frame the process as a communication in which the 
  
 11 See generally GILLES FAUCONNIER & MARK TURNER, THE WAY WE THINK: 
CONCEPTUAL BLENDING AND THE MIND’S HIDDEN COMPLEXITIES (2002); RAY JACKENDOFF, 
PATTERNS IN THE MIND: LANGUAGE AND HUMAN NATURE (1993); C. E. Shannon, A 
Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECHNICAL J. 379 (1948). 
 12 See generally ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC 
DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (1998). 
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structure of compression and expansion help the interpreter 
better illuminate the task at hand. 
II.  LEGISLATIVE INTENT, AUTHORITY, AND PROCESS 
Who, after all, is doing the communicating? As Larry 
Alexander and James Brudney have rightly noted in their 
response to our recent article,13 a key puzzle in an account of 
statutory meaning that looks squarely to communication theory 
is how to best view the 535 federal legislators (perhaps adding 
the President to this mix as well). Can we overcome the 
objection that Congress, being a “they” not an “it,” is hard to 
perceive as any sort of communicator?14 While this observation is 
particularly potent in connection with our description, it is not a 
new critique. Many prominent scholars have raised various 
objections to the notion of collective meaning in connection with 
“intentionalist” theories of statutory interpretation more 
generally. The critiques are powerful, if somewhat far-flung—
sometimes raising social-choice-related critiques to legislative 
intent, other times questioning the metaphysical properties of 
(to use William Buzbee’s felicitous phrase) the “one Congress 
fiction” of statutory interpretation,15 and generally questioning 
the idea that legislative will is reduced to an act of 
communication from a body with a singular will.  
Though appreciating the dilemma of drawing 
conclusions about legislative intent from evidence produced 
within a collective body, our basic responses track two large 
themes. First, we insist that the act of communication manifest 
through legislative action is that established by a distinct 
public act (i.e., a statute) whose pedigree is established by 
constitutional rules of enactment—namely, the final vote on 
passage. Whatever we might say about the greater political 
stature of a law enacted by, say, 500 legislators than one 
enacted by a slim majority, we would never say that the former 
is a statute and the latter is not. Article I, Section 7, of the U.S. 
  
 13 Larry Alexander, How to Understand Legislatures: A Comment on 
Boudreau, Lupia, McCubbins, and Rodriguez, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 993 (2007); James 
J. Brudney, Intentionalism’s Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001 (2007). 
 14 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative 
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992). For a rejoinder, see 
Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory Is 
Misapplied Against Legislative Intent, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 585 (2005). 
 15 William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2000). 
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Constitution gives the legislature the authority to convert its 
myriad individual preferences (or hopes, dreams, etc.) into a 
statute, and it does so by the requirement of majority assent.16 
The realities of the legislative process are, of course, 
considerably more complicated than this simple resort to an 
Article I provision would suggest. But our point here is that 
constitutional rules of procedure solve what would be an 
insurmountable problem of aggregating heterogeneous 
individual intentions into a collective intent. Meaningful 
communication is not the extrinsically derived aggregation of 
intent but the statute that is enacted. We have called this 
understanding—with a hat tip to philosopher Daniel Dennett—
the “intentional(ist) stance,”17 a phrase capturing the use of 
intent as a heuristic device to understand communication 
rather than an admittedly intractable inquiry into the 
epistemology of multiple intentions. 
Second, we see legislative intent in the details of 
legislative procedure—this time focusing on the practical 
dimensions of legislative procedure, rather than specific 
constitutional constructions, to support the idea that statutes 
are meaningful communications.18 Some scholars have taken 
the view that legislative intent is meaningless, concluding that 
statutes do not accurately track the democratic will of 
disagreeing legislators.19 However, the constitution of 
legislative procedure that enables diverse lawmakers to 
collaborate on legislative initiatives and pass (with some 
frequency) statutes in a polarized environment belies the 
contention that legislative processes are simply too chaotic or 
incoherent to warrant authority and respect. To be sure, we 
have not offered any response to the democratic objection. Our 
  
 16 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 17 Boudreau et al., The Intentional(ist) Stance, supra note 1, at 2131-32, 2138-43. 
 18 Professor Lawrence Solan has written extensively—and, to us, 
persuasively—about legislatures’ capacity to implement through its statutory text a 
publicly available legislative intent. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, 
Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 427 (2005). Although Solan is interested squarely in the insight of cognitive 
psychology (particularly, “theories of mind”) and its application to collective intent, he 
focuses fruitfully on the construction of the legislative process as a mechanism for 
synthesizing and articulating collective intent through rationally constructed 
procedures and instruments. Id. at 444-49. In referring to Congress’s delegation of 
lawmaking prerogatives to legislative committees, for example, Professor Solan notes 
succinctly that “not only does the legislature form its plans through the work of a small 
number of its members, but it is structured to do things just that way.” Id. at 446. 
 19 See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Lupia & 
McCubbins, supra note 14, at 594-98; Shepsle, supra note 14. 
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burden here, however, is more modest: to (at least) support the 
argument that statutes are meaningful communications and, 
moreover, that legislative processes facilitate these 
communications by enabling legislators to negotiate 
discernible, enactable outcomes. 
We cannot answer the question, “what do statutes 
mean?,” without first considering the question, “how are 
statutes made?” The legislative process defines the 
compression algorithm with which congressional 
communications are transmitted. Thus, efforts to interpret 
law—to essentially construct an expansion process that most 
closely resembles the compression process—must begin with a 
coherent theory of lawmaking. While we present one such 
theory elsewhere,20 any model of the legislative process must 
define how multiple legislators successfully coordinate to 
collectively adopt a single statute (the communication) and the 
internal legislative process through which law is made.  
III.  COMMUNICATION AND INTERPRETATION 
In our view, statutes are compressed policy instructions 
or procedural guidelines, chosen by the legislators who pass 
them (specifically, members of the majority party); subsequent 
actors (such as judges, agencies, or citizens) are left to expand a 
statute’s meaning when applying or interpreting it. Because 
discerning the meaning of these communications requires 
corresponding compression and expansion schemes, the 
interpretation of federal statutes must begin with an 
examination of the congressional legislative process. If we ignore 
the process by which members of the majority party compress 
meaning when writing statutes, how are we to develop an 
expansion scheme that accurately discerns such meaning? We 
cannot develop a proper expansion scheme without an 
understanding of the legislative process. For this reason, we now 
briefly discuss the various stages of the legislative process with 
an eye toward developing a corresponding expansion scheme 
that jurists can use when interpreting statutes.  
Federal legislators in the United States must go through a 
number of stages to pass statutes, and crucially, the majority 
party in each chamber has a veto (or vetoes) over what gets 
  
 20 See Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 971-81. 
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passed.21 Indeed, legislators typically delegate the legislature’s 
agenda-setting authority and the task of allocating the 
legislature’s scarce resources to the majority-party leadership. 
Given this delegation of authority, the issue becomes how 
members assure that the people to whom agenda-setting power 
has been delegated do not take advantage of this authority and 
use it for their own personal gain. In general, legislators use 
checks and balances to solve this dilemma. They provide others 
with a veto over the actions of agenda setters, and give others an 
opportunity and incentive to act as checks. These checks and 
balances may be very subtle. In the U.S. House of 
Representatives, for example, backbenchers may check their 
leaders’ actions through the committee process and must give 
their approval to their leaders’ actions on the floor of the chamber. 
For our purposes, it is important to note the numerous 
places where a statute may be discussed, revised, or amended by 
legislators in the majority party. For example, in the initial 
stages of the congressional lawmaking process, the majority-
party members of substantive committees in each chamber have 
significant agenda control within their jurisdiction. It is at this 
stage where the drafting of statutes begins, where the writing of 
committee reports takes place, and where conversations between 
committee chairs and majority-party committee members are 
held. Additionally, because the majority party in Congress 
always holds a majority of seats on each substantive committee, 
members of the minority party are largely shut out, even at this 
early stage of the legislative process. 
As a given proposal approaches the floor, the majority 
party’s influence continues to grow. Indeed, the majority 
party’s members delegate to their leadership a broad variety of 
matters. The Rules Committee and the Speaker, the Senate 
majority leader (and, in many cases, the Senate minority 
leader)—as well as the Budget and Appropriations Committees 
if any funding is required to implement the proposal—check 
  
 21 See generally GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE 
LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993); GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. 
MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 42 (2005); D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. 
MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE 
APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 34 (1991); Gerald Gamm & Steven S. Smith, Policy 
Leadership and the Development of the Modern Senate, in PARTY, PROCESS, AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS 
287 (David Brady & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2002); Charles O. Jones, Joseph G. 
Cannon & Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of 
Representatives, 30 J. POL. 617, 617-18 (1968). 
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committee members’ ability to propose legislation, for these two 
central coordinating bodies control access to plenary time. If a 
substantive committee’s proposal is not representative of the 
majority party’s collective interests, and if it is an issue of 
importance to the majority party, then either the Speaker or 
the Rules Committee is likely to kill the proposal. 
Before a proposal leaves the chamber, there are floor 
debates, floor amendments, and the votes themselves. During 
floor debates, the bill manager for the majority party controls 
the time devoted to debate and to particular amendments, 
determining which members speak and for how long. It is not 
unusual for a number of amendments to be added to a proposal 
during this stage unless, as in the House, the majority-party-
controlled Rules Committee grants a special rule that limits 
the number and nature of amendments (in the Senate, bills are 
often considered under Unanimous Consent Agreements, or the 
majority leader can “fill the agenda tree,” leaving no room for 
other amendments to be offered). And given the majority 
party’s influence at nearly every stage of the legislative 
process, by the time the proposed legislation reaches a final-
passage vote on the floor, the majority party has typically 
ensured its own victory (although there are occasionally 
instances where the majority party and its leaders must corral 
a few additional votes on the floor).  
The congressional process is, in essence, a running 
conversation in which some members—specifically those to 
whom the majority party has delegated authority to set the 
agenda and write statutes—use the tools required by their 
principals (e.g., committee reports, statements by the bill 
manager, communications by the party whips, etc.) to signal the 
meaning of their actions (i.e., the statutes they have written) to 
the remaining members of the majority party. As we discuss 
below, checks and balances within the legislative process serve 
to make these communications trustworthy. The system may not 
be transparent to members of the minority party—who are often 
even left out of committee meetings and hearings, and have 
limited influence in the choice of statutory language both in 
committee and on the floor. However, the system is transparent 
for members of the majority party, as the discussion above 
demonstrates. Throughout the legislative process, the 
compression of legislative meaning occurs in several ways and at 
a variety of stages, beginning with the drafting of statutes, 
proceeding to the writing of committee reports and the debating 
of statutes on the floor, and ending with the bill manager’s 
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statements and floor amendments. Because each stage involves 
the compression of meaning on the part of legislators in the 
majority party, a proper expansion scheme must correspond to 
these stages. In other words, to properly expand the compressed 
communication, the interpreter must understand the processes 
by which the communication has worked its way through the 
legislative process. 
Identifying these key actors and paying particular 
attention to the pivotal role of some legislators (or some small 
body of legislators) in the legislative process can often help 
judges adjudicate between competing candidate interpretations 
of the same statute.22 To be sure, minority-party legislators, as 
Professor Brudney helpfully reminds us, are important players 
in the legislative process.23 Minority-party legislators are 
particularly influential in the Senate, where traditional norms 
of Senate process impact in various ways the ability of pure 
majorities to implement their will.24 But this point depicts 
statutes as the revealed will of majority-party preferences, a 
depiction to which we do not subscribe. We see statutes as the 
products of complex bargaining processes; they are instruments 
of a diverse set of legislators and will entail judgments, 
compromises, and tradeoffs involving members of both parties. 
And we certainly agree that “the architecture of legislative 
conversations culminating in enactment may also vary based 
on the subject matter area being addressed by Congress.”25 The 
generalization we draw from the large literature on 
congressional process and performance is three-fold: First, 
legislators develop and use internal lawmaking processes to 
facilitate their discrete aims. Second, they collaborate, 
cooperate, and occasionally compete with others on these 
agendas. And third, the outcome of these processes is statutes 
that communicate meaningful information about what a 
majority of Congress enacted into law. Furthermore, whatever 
we can learn about how legislators forged these deals will help 
us better understand the meaning of what they enacted.  
  
 22 See generally Rodriguez & Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of 
Legislative History, supra note 4; McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive 
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & 
Spring 1994, at 3; McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in 
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992). 
 23 Brudney, supra note 13, at 1013-16. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 1016. 
990 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3 
IV.  POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY OF LAWMAKING AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Communication theory and a theory of lawmaking 
based on positive political theory (PPT) can help illuminate 
some of the key issues in statutory interpretation.26 Moreover, 
we will say more ambitiously (if still tentatively) that these 
twin theories can support particular interpretive techniques—
for instance, an informed use of legislative history to resolve 
disagreements over statutory meaning. To generate further 
conversation along these lines, we offer some thoughts about 
the canons of statutory interpretation. In general, we suggest 
that these canons’ suitability to resolving interpretive issues be 
judged by how informative they are in addressing the 
compression-expansion structure and, as well, how accurately 
they track the PPT of the lawmaking process.  
Communication theory and PPT share in common the 
recognition that the legislative process reflects a “conversation” 
among legislators. Indeed, at each stage of the legislative 
process, legislators communicate with each other and compress 
meaning by drafting statutes, writing committee reports, 
participating in floor debates, offering amendments, and 
engaging in various other legislative tasks.27 In interpreting 
statutes, judges must “listen to” and interpret these 
“conversations.” Judges must not assume that legislators were 
speaking to them in their conversations; nor should judges 
treat legislators’ conversations as though legislators were 
either naïvely listening to everything said in the conversation 
or being lied to about everything. Instead, judges must 
passively listen to legislators’ conversations so that their 
expansions (i.e., interpretations) correspond to the way that 
statutory meaning was compressed. 
Because judges are not flies on the wall during the 
processes of legislative deliberation, they must orient their 
interpretations of these conversations around plausible 
accounts of what available information reveals.28 The debate 
over the relevance and utility of legislative history deals 
squarely with this difficult process. As we and others have 
written, not all legislative history is equal.29 In addition to 
  
 26 See Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 971-81. 
 27 See supra Part III.  
 28 Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 979-81. 
 29 Id. 
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communicating their intent, individual legislators may send 
messages designed to claim credit for policy victories, to shift 
blame for defeats, to jam the signals of their opponents, and, 
more generally, to ensure their reelection in the next electoral 
contest.30 Having advocated legislative history as a tool for 
statutory interpretation and as a key component of our 
approach, we in no way suggest that judges use legislative 
history indiscriminately. Rather, we emphasize that some 
aspects of legislative history are trustworthy indicia of 
legislative meaning and others are not. Thus, the task for 
judges interpreting statutes is to determine which aspects of 
legislative history are trustworthy and to rely only upon those 
aspects when discerning the meaning of statutes. Elsewhere, 
we provide some key criteria judges can use to identify 
trustworthy sources of information.31 
This process also implicates debates over the use of 
canons of statutory construction. Consider, for example, the 
plain-meaning approach to statutory construction, a general 
approach undergirded by the canon that statutory language 
should be accorded its plain—rather than any especially 
imaginative or counterintuitive—meaning.32 The suitability of 
this hoary rule turns squarely on what we expect to be the 
processes by which legislators have compressed their 
communications in the first instance and, in turn, what their 
expectations are with respect to the processes of expansion by the 
receiver. Where certain language has a plain meaning—without 
making any effort here to define what is or is not plain—the 
plain meaning would seem to have the great asset of minimizing 
noise and, within the structure of the compression-expansion 
algorithm central to the communication process, minimizing the 
risk of error. Yet the plain-meaning approach goes wrong in its 
positive assertion that language usually does have a plain 
meaning and that the process is not really about interpretation 
  
 30 See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 
(2d ed. 1974). 
 31 See Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean, supra note 1, at 971-79. 
 32 While plain-meaning interpretation has often been treated synonymously 
with interpretive textualism, it is important to see them as distinct. Textualism refers 
to a comprehensive theory of interpretation that regards the text as the only legitimate 
subject of interpretation and sees extrinsic evidence of statutory meaning (such as 
legislative history) as irrelevant to the enterprise. Reference to plain-meaning 
interpretation has in mind a particular perspective on how one reads the text and thus 
is seen properly as a rule of interpretation. 
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and is merely a matter of application.33 In short, what we need to 
know to make use of this canon are (at least) two critical things: 
(1) the capacity of language in a particular instance to be 
rendered to a plain (rather than, to use a clumsy term, “unplain”) 
meaning, and (2) the expected treatment of certain language by 
those with authorized involvement in both the compression and 
expansion process. If we lack sufficient knowledge in either of 
these dimensions—and, to be sure, our focus in this essay is on 
the second of these matters—then the plain-meaning canon will 
not meet its intended goals. So “it depends” is all we are in a 
strong position to say about the plain-meaning canon in the 
context of statutory interpretation generally. 
Next, consider rules that impute to the legislature the 
intent to create broad remedial policies where the language used 
in the statute does not point ambiguously in the direction of 
those policies. Examples of these rules include the implied right 
of action, the presumption of reviewability, and the old canon 
that liberal statutes be broadly construed. While they reflect 
different aims and histories, they are of a common piece with the 
notion that proper statutory interpretation puts a thumb on the 
scale in favor of “progressive” social policy. Relatedly, it gives an 
edge to judicial intervention (as in the case of the implied right 
of action and the reviewability presumption). From our 
perspective, these rules, taken as a whole, are inconsistent with 
both the structured process of communication and, as well, the 
positive political theory of lawmaking. 
First, these rules essentially rewrite the statute to 
insert provisions regarding the statute’s scope and the 
procedures to be followed in the statute’s implementation. So, 
for example, the creation of an implied right of action adds 
language where none existed; it also reorients the 
administration of the statute (an administration that will 
frequently entail an administrative agency) by adding a new 
institution to the mix—an institution with its own roles, rules, 
and powers.34 A statute might have, in the first instance, 
contained an administrative mechanism that gave relevant 
legislative committees and subcommittees principal 
  
 33 For especially influential renderings of this claim, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 59 (1988). 
 34 Cf. Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in 
Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1992). 
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prerogative to engage in various forms of “police patrol” or “fire 
alarm” oversight.35 Interposing a court in this process by 
providing a route to judicial review will inevitably, and at the 
very least, reconfigure the processes of legislative scrutiny and 
the general structure of policy implementation. 
In essence, statutes reflect complex tradeoffs. No matter 
how strongly worded a particular policy directive is,36 the choice 
of how best to implement this policy both in terms of the level 
and technique of enforcement and in terms of the resources 
devoted to these initiatives in one or another budgetary cycle (a 
choice manifest acutely in the constitutionally prescribed 
appropriations process) entails difficult tradeoffs. A canon that 
layers onto a legislative compromise a particular directive that 
the legislature either did not consider or, as is more likely, 
declined to create, undermines these tradeoffs. And whatever 
we might say about this strategy as a normative matter, we are 
content here to say that such an interpretive rule is 
fundamentally inconsistent with both the theory of 
communication and the positive political theory of lawmaking. 
In earlier work, we considered two additional canons—
the whole act rule and the appropriations canon—and 
explained why they conflict with theories of communication 
and lawmaking.37 The whole act rule presumes, implausibly, 
that the legislature set out to write a completely coherent 
policy in which all parts would mesh seamlessly and every 
embedded policy would reinforce the other. This idea, too, 
conflicts with the notion that statutes are inevitably about 
tradeoffs and compromise. Moreover, the whole act rule 
supposes that the communication being compressed and later 
expanded is one omnibus communication that meets strict 
standards of transitivity, consistency, and coherence. That may 
well be our democratic ambition. But we can all conjure up 
  
 35 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165-66 (1984). 
 36 For instance, the directions in the federal environmental statutes to 
regulate all “significant risks” and to use the “best available technology” to clean up air 
and water pollution. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(p)(1) (2006) (“Such modified 
requirements shall apply the best available technology economically achievable on a 
case-by-case basis, using best professional judgment, to set specific numerical effluent 
limitations in each permit.”); 42 U.S.C. § 6905(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (“As promptly as 
practicable . . . the Administrator shall submit a report describing . . . any significant 
risks to human health posed by these emissions . . . .”). 
 37 See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical 
Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations 
Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 669 (2005). 
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examples in which this ambition is not met in the crucible of 
real political decision making and real statutes. Relatedly, the 
claim that legislative changes made through the appropriations 
process lack the deliberative qualities of substantive legislative 
decisions is problematic—both from the vantage point of the 
(undertheorized, empirically problematic) notion of 
deliberation38 and from a plausible account of how legislators 
communicate through their fiscal decisions. There is absolutely 
no reason to expect that the kinds of choices and tradeoffs 
made by legislators in their decision making over annual 
appropriations cannot be subject to exactly the same logic of 
compression and expansion as can other legislative choices. 
Moreover, the structures embodied in legislative decision 
making on appropriations jibe in ways that have been 
neglected by both political scientists and legal scholars with a 
sensible account of legislative policymaking. In short, the PPT 
account of the appropriations process undermines the canon of 
construction invented in TVA v. Hill39 and more or less followed 
ever since: that legislative changes through the appropriations 
process ought to be narrowly construed. 
The more global lesson to draw from this analysis is 
that familiar canons of statutory construction can be hard to 
square with what we believe to be the best assessment of how 
and why the legislature functions to communicate through the 
statutory-enactment process. Still, these canons may serve 
important normative goals. These goals may include the 
improvement of legislative processes and the implementation of 
what William Eskridge and Philip Frickey label “quasi-
constitutional” objectives.40 However we evaluate the merits of 
these objectives, we should see them as orthogonal to the core 
positive objective of facilitating interpretive approaches that 
are broadly congruent with theories of communication and 
democratic lawmaking. While much has been said in the 
voluminous literature on statutory interpretation—and even 
more remains to be said—about these important normative 
objectives, our contribution here to the debate is principally 
positive; that is, we endeavor to show that plausible 
  
 38 Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does Deliberating 
Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 39 (2006); McCubbins & 
Rodriguez, supra note 37, at 691. 
 39  Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-93 (1978).  
 40 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: 
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992). 
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interpretive principles can be derived thoughtfully from a 
model of statute making that builds upon theories of 
communication and legislative process. 
